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Does the Anthropocene Require Us To Be Saints?
In the spirit of this workshop conference, I shall not today advance a thesis or propose
any answer to my question. You will hear a problem and the reason this problem should
matter to us. A signal-flare from the cubbyhole of academic theory in which I work will
accompany the presentation of this problem. For, although I have what I think is an answer
to the problem, my views come from the domain of philosophy of history. This is a field and
a discourse that is unknown to most American philosophers. Indeed, it is at best severely
misunderstood, and by consequence it hardly exists in this country as a professional interest,
although in fact many philosophers use it or do it all the time. It is, in my view, a subsuming
field—that is to say, it is a fundamental philosophical inquiry that cuts across all topics in so
far as they have a diachronic, or roughly “historical,” aspect. In any case, the brevity of our
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format leaves the presentations short of detail. But the advantage of not arguing an answer is
that I get to hear your thoughts. This presentation is one of several salients for thinking
through the place of moral life and thought in human temporality and historicity, including
that of future history, such as the Anthropocene, and in particular questions about
personhood in a milieu in which non-human species might have moral claims upon us. I
hope to launch your further consideration of these matters in your work on the
Anthropocene and anti-anthropocentrism.
When I ask whether the Anthropocene requires us to be saints, I am asking if any of
the conditions of this era in which humankind lives, or will soon live, require us to think
conscientiously about whether human moral agents ought to perform supererogatory acts
that satisfy moral obligations to others, both human and non-human, that arise in
Anthropocene circumstances. Supererogatory acts are those acts that one’s understanding of
moral good does not require her to do but that it does commend her to do as fulfilment of or
as practical or logical extensions of her morality of right and wrong. We commonly say that
such acts are “above and beyond the call of duty,” such as throwing one’s self on a bomb in
order to save the lives of others whom it would have hurt or killed without an obstructing
intervening act.
One of the many oddities of supererogation is that while it is by definition wholly
voluntary and optional, it is also deontic. The concept relies on some notion of duty that is
purported to be special and distinct from actual moral obligation in theory, even when in
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practice those who perform supererogatory acts often say that duty or moral law required
them to perform these acts; indeed, they rarely give any other reason. If you squint at it,
supererogation looks like every duty under the moral law of rational freedom in Kant’s
ethics. There is, so to speak, something passive-aggressive about this concept as usually
formulated. For us the concept is useful, even if it cannot be saved from incoherence, because
it expresses the perfectionist structure (or temptation) in any deontic moral philosophy. Let
us settle for saying that the issue for us concerns non-Kantian supererogatory moral ideals,
claims, or counsels to act toward such ideals.
Any anti-anthropocentrism that requires or strongly requires supererogatory behavior
is what I call rigid, or thorough-going, anti-anthropocentrism. David Roden discusses a
consideration that I regard as an example of supererogation under rigid disanthropocentrization. Normatively, it is wrong to inhibit the flourishing of other humans.
Would it not then be wrong for us not to live in such a way as to maximize the flourishing of
post-human intelligent beings by not preparing the Earth for them or by standing their way
by any in any manner?1 Note that the question as it stands is limited in application to beings
of our intelligence or greater intelligence, defined in some way it us not necessary to specify
here. The same moral principle can be applied to other kinds of current life on Earth when

1

David Roden, Posthuman Life: Philosophy at the Edge of the Human, 121–123, 135, and

186–192.

4
we ask if it is not a morally correct though supererogatory counsel not to eat meat. Even
consequentialists urge supererogatory claims for life in the Anthropocene through “effective
altruism.” The Oxford philosopher Toby Ord is a good example of this: he owns very little,
lives on a small fraction of his salary, and donates the rest. Perhaps this is not sacrifice
enough, or perhaps consequentialism mitigates supererogatory claims.
It is not possible to verify now what might or might not be required of us in the
Anthropocene future, invisible over the horizon. The extent of the moral demand to disanthropocentrize is dependent on this future history in its further reaches, so it is likewise
not possible to see what this shall require of us. Ethical rules, or maxims, usually stand
between us and the supererogatory. But in the case at hand a highly externalist moral
situation, made even more lopsided by a fear of extinction that makes reservations about decentering ourselves appear to be foolish and vain, rules do little to protect us from
unbearable burdens.
Therefore, we must ask whether our conceptions of good moral life and of right acts
constrain in any way the supererogatory claims of the Anthropocene upon us. For example:
1. If one is asked to take a drug that will adjust the human mind to act in accord with
contemporary expectations of Anthropocene dis-anthropecentrization but that might have
very serious side-effects, should she take it?
2. If one knows that a more efficient life-form (such as fungi) can colonize humans so
as to create a more sustainable biosphere by prevailing over our species, should she try to
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stop it?
3. If one knows that by eating the minimal survivable diet and by living without
power or other ecocidal conveniences she will improve the lives of our descendants, should
she live in this way?
4. If one knows that a particular variety of suicide will improve life for a successor
intelligent species in Earth that is soon to appear, should she commit suicide?
5. If Anthropocene dis-anthropecentrization requires that we not reproduce, should
we cease to reproduce?
6. If thorough-going dis-anthropecentrization convincingly and empirically entails
that we must not use technology that clearly benefits humans and that cannot be replaced,
should we cease to use it?
7. If thorough-going dis-anthropecentrization convincingly and empirically argues
that humankind cease to use certain raw materials from Earth or from other planets for our
well-being, should we cease to find or to use such materials?
8. If thorough-going dis-anthropecentrization convincingly and empirically shows
that caring for human survival creates conditions that degrade the survival of other current
species, or species yet to come, or artificial intelligences, or advanced aliens, should we cease
to care for human survival?
9. Do the moral claims of successor species counsel us to forego grief or alarm at the
demise of humankind?
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10. What moral claims does machinic intelligence have on us today?
These questions illustrate what I mean when I ask whether the Anthropocene requires us to
be saints.
This problem will remind some of you of the distinction between deep ecology and
shallow ecology. Or it will bring to mind the ideas of Pentti Linkola, who said, “If there were
a button I could press, I would sacrifice myself without hesitating, if it meant millions of
people would die.” 2 I find that Zoltan Báldiszár Simon’s distinction between “critical
posthumanism” and “technological posthumanism” is useful here. The former seeks a just
balance between humankind and the nonhuman. On the other hand,
Technological posthumanism is not concerned with describing already existing nonhuman inhabitants of the planet as fellows to humans. Instead, it invests in the
prospect of bringing about not-yet-existing non-human beings in various ways, from
enhanced beings escaping human confines to the expected creation of greater-thanhuman machine intelligence. Put differently, technological posthumanism envisions
the emergence of an era of posthumanity. 3
2

Dana Milbank, “A Strange Finnish Thinker Posits War, Famine as Ultimate 'Goods,” The Wall

Street Journal Asia, 24 May 1994: 1
3

Zoltan Báldiszár Simon, “(The Impossibility of) Acting Upon a Story that We Can Believe,”

Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice , vol. 22, no. 1 (2018): 114 (1054–125)
https://doi.org/10.1080/13642529.2017.1419445
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Much of the best work on our “historical future” is today done by philosophers of history.
Simon is a leader in this, and although I very much disagree with him I commend his
writings to your attention.
Simon also challenges the favorable reception that the Anthropocene has received in
the humanities. He thinks it is too easy, and in this I agree with him. This is at least in part a
case of glamor overriding full awareness of the moral claims that a glamorous idea entails. As
with the love of “vibrant matter” and neo-materialisms, the academic humanities must
continue to think in chief about how to judge these claims. Consider these words of Pentti
Linkola, whom I mentioned a moment ago:
What to do, when a ship carrying a hundred passengers suddenly capsizes and only
one lifeboat? When the lifeboat is full, those who hate life will try to load it with
more people and sink the lot. Those who love and respect life will take the ship’s axe
and sever the extra hands that cling to the sides of the boat.4
I contend that Linkola’s line of thought was the most rebarbative version of deep ecology. He
thought it through all the way to the end of the line.
You can find ways to beat back his awful extremism, but you must undertake this task
4

Pentti Linkola, “The Doctrine Of Survival And Doctor Ethics,” chapter VI of The Woreld and

We (1992) at
http://www.penttilinkola.com/pentti_linkola/ecofascism_writings/translations/voisikoelamavoitta
a_translation/VI%20-%20The%20World%20And%20We/
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by fully using all the theoretical tools. These are, broadly, in my view, of two sorts. First: the
concepts and methods of normative ethics, for one of the whole points of philosophical
thought is to think an idea out to all the corners, the very dark corners, to which mere a
priori thought leads. And the second comes straight out of the first: it is politics and the rest
of moral philosophy. For it is real human well-being, happiness, and joy, or suffering and
sadness that are at stake here. As many scientists have acknowledged, the Anthropocene and
dis-anthropocentrization are political ideas and rhetorical concepts to a far greater degree,
and require struggles of those kids, than the enjoyment of fresh critical perspectives by
academics leads us to realize.
The response I expect to come rapidly is that we must view dis-anthropocentrization
by taking up the perspective of Speculative Realism and particular that of Object-Oriented
Ontology. Now, for reasons too intricate in detail here, I reject much of all New Realisms and
neo-materialisms because of problems in their clotted logic and metaphysics, and I
thoroughly reject Speculative Realism and particularly Object-Oriented Ontology because of
these issues and because of their hopeless conceptions of historicity and sociality and because
of the bad politics following therefrom—problems that not all New Realisms fully share. The
point for present concerns is that if you expect object-oriented ontology to guide you
through the kind of moral quandary I have raised, it will not do. Instead, you must use it to
squash the moral dilemmas in order to establish the ontology you want. But Object-Oriented
Ontology and related thought will not counsel you in moral matters after it has been
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established because it has already decided them. It can be established solely upon its
defenders’ preferred conclusions or deflections as to most of these issues, because it
evacuated the issues. Moral life comes before ontology—this is my view because it is true—
and this a good example.
In order actually to consider the kinds of question that this problematic generates,
here are several considerations from within the constitution of moral experience that will
bear on proper phenomenological and existential deliberation in this field.
1. How do we manage our self-destructiveness that de-centering humankind might
provoke?
2. What right actions might the limits of human consciousness interdict?
3. As against the impartialist normativity of rigid anti-anthropocentrism, how do we
theorize the local loyalties and projects that deeply characterize human sociality?
4. What use are imperfect rights of non-humans that are counterpart to the perfect
duties attending self-preservation of our species?
5. How do we understand relationality in the Anthropocene?
6. What are the elements of a constructive concept of a good community, or polity,
that includes humans and nonhumans?
7. What political projects concerning justice press us? What can improved democracy
contribute or not contribute?
In the case of the Anthropocene we see a powerful interconnection between
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understanding history and knowing the right things to do. In the case of disanthropocentrization, the basis of the historical-temporal mode of human existence—the key
discovery of modernity, of which the phenomenology of Dasein is an exemplary but by no
means the only component—is challenged in so far as it is a presentation of more traditional
humanism. What was revolutionary in modernity thus now blurs into a process from the
past it presumed to reject. One can with good reason contend that this is true of every
revolution at least from early modernity to the present. So the final question with which I
shall leave you is:
Will the outcome if what at this point appear to be the “unprecedented challenges” of
our relation to the natural world require us to dispose of the human model of personhood —
descending from Protagoras’ statement of the human measure—in favor of sacrificing
humankind, or will we be able to improve the human lot from its present awful state, or will
the future turn out to be, as it so often does, pretty much the same mixture of good and bad,
of justice and injustice, of blessings and of misery, as the past has been?

